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Abstract. Does regional autonomy lead to better local public services? We investigate this issue 
using measures of public service performance and autonomy at the region level in 171 European 
regions. We introduce a novel dose-response approach which identifies the pattern of the effect of 
regional autonomy on the performance of public services. The relationship between the level of 
regional autonomy and the provision of local public services exhibits a u-shape: both low and high 
autonomy lead to better local public services. This speaks against the optimal level of autonomy and 
policy recommendations based on the view that more decentralisation is always desirable. It shows 
that different institutional settings can be economically viable and efficient. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Does regional autonomy lead to a better provision of local public services? This question derives 
from a key argument in decentralization theory claiming that regional autonomy improves the 
quality of local governments, both in terms of the efficiency and the level in the provision of public 
goods (Hayek, 1945; Olson, 1993; Tiebout, 1956), accountability to citizens’ preferences (Oates, 
1972), and control of the public expenditure (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; González-Alegre, 2015; 
Liberati and Sacchi, 2013). This claim has been recently challenged by several counter-arguments. 
Inter-jurisdictional competition may lead to a race to the bottom at the expenses of government 
quality; local governments can be more easily captured; fiscal “over-grazing” might occur when 
citizens are less capable of attributing merits or blame to different governments level (e.g. Breton, 
2002; Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés, 2011; Oates, 2005; Tanzi, 2001; Treisman, 2007).  
As a matter of fact, decentralization has become quite popular over the past decades and virtually 
every country today is confronted with the opportunity to whether introduce decentralization 
reforms or not. In several cases decentralization reforms have been the results of bottom-up 
political processes in which citizens and local governments themselves have asked central 
government to provide for greater autonomy in terms of political power and fiscal resources. The 
recent referendum in Scotland, the Constitutional reform in Italy started in 2001, and the claims for 
independence of Cataluña in Spain are just a few cases in points. These instances of local autonomy 
can depend on different circumstances, some having long-standing historical roots, other some 
contingent motives such as the pressure of globalization or supra-national regional integration 
(Bache and Jones, 2000; Ermini and Santolini, 2014). However, the economic factor has become 
prominent in the decentralisation discourse (Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). At the core of the 
instances for greater decentralization there is the view that when local governments are provided 
with more resource and entitled with higher autonomy and political legitimacy, this should improve 
the provisions of local public goods and services. If this is so, this should be reflected into the 
perceptions of citizens. 
The organization for the provision of local public services differs across countries. First of all, the 
organization of public services depends upon the type of states, which can be grouped in three 
broad categories, namely federal states, regionalized states, unitary states. Accordingly, the 
allocation of competences varies considerably, distinguishing between exclusive competences and 
shared competences; in addition, competences can be divided into legislative and administrative. 
Usually, in unitary states the legislative competences belong to the central government, while 
administrative competences can be attributed to different levels of governments. In decentralized 
settings, such as federal or regionalized countries, the legislative competences of some local services 
can be attributed to the regional level. Taxation for public services also varies considerably across 
countries, some in which regional governments have taxation power; others in which the bulk of the 
services are financed thought a mechanism of transfers from the central government. As a result, it 
is easy to observe a great deal of heterogeneity when it comes to the regional competences across 
countries regarding the provision of public services, even when they are local services, such as for 
instance in the cases of education, public transport, health, police, etc (see European Institute of 
Public Administration (EIPA), 2012). There are countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden where regions have no specific competences on their own; 
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federal countries like Belgium, in which regional governments have no competences on education, 
or like Germany, in which instead the Lands have competences above a large number of services.  
Similar patterns can be found for other local public services (e.g. health) (see also Sacchi and Salotti, 
2014).1 
Grounded on the theory of fiscal federalism and decentralization, this paper aims to test whether 
local public services are better (in terms of citizens’ satisfaction) in countries in which regional 
governments retain greater autonomy in their provision. We employ a comprehensive measure of 
decentralization (or regional authority) to capture the different organizational structure of the 
provision of local public services, and a measure of the satisfaction of residents on local public 
services to capture their quality. Two contributions are provided. Firstly, we take the region as the 
unit of analysis - in a sample of 171 European regions – employing measures of local public service 
quality and autonomy of local governments at the region level. Secondly, we introduce a novel 
methodology based on a dose-response approach that has important advantages compared to 
traditional regression models, in that allows us to identify the entire pattern of the effect of regional 
autonomy along the quality of local public services. 
The relationship between the quality of local public services and regional autonomy (or 
decentralization) has been addressed within that strand of literature which examines the 
relationship between decentralization and the quality of government (or quality of institutions). 
Most of these studies are based on cross-country and country based analysis.2 There are both 
theoretical and practical reasons for that. Regional autonomy is supposed to improve the overall 
quality of government, and hence analysis should not be limited to sub-national governments 
(Treisman, 2007). Data on the quality of government are quite rich at the country level and scarce at 
the region level. A number of indicators are provided for a large set of countries and a long span of 
time, such as the case of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by World Bank, 
which is quite popular in these studies. Finally, several countries have introduced decentralization 
reforms over the past decades to increase their economic performance and this has spurred 
increasing interest for cross-country empirical work. 
However, conducting the analysis at the country level also raises some issues. Firstly, in order to rely 
on a sufficient size of the sample, countries that are quite heterogeneous tend to be included. In 
these cases results can be driven by some groups of countries; to this regard, negative effect of 
decentralization are very often found to depend on less-developed countries (Blanchard and 
Shleifer, 2000; O’Dwyer and Ziblatt, 2006). Secondly, studying the effect of decentralization on the 
overall quality of government implies a long causal chain going from the local level to the aggregate 
level which can take time to take place and can depend on several other circumstances. Thirdly and 
                                                          
1 A comprehensive report on this issue can be consulted here: http://www.cesifo-
group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Other-Topics/Structural-Policy/Regional-Policy/DP-MC-reg-comp/fileBinary/DP-
MC-reg-comp.pdf.  
2 See (Bae et al., 2015; e.g. Bartolini and Santolini, 2012; Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Grassmueck and Shields, 
2010; Kyriacou et al., 2015; Thornton, 2007). Those works looking at the sub-national level tend to be based on 
a case-study approach (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Faguet, 2004). In a recent paper Diaz-Serrano and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2011) takes a different perspective much similar to ours. Using micro data from the European 
social survey in 29 European countries, they find that political and fiscal decentralization have a positive and 
significant effect on individuals’ overall happiness, as well as satisfaction with political and economic 
institutions and with the education and health systems. 
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more importantly, the essence of fiscal decentralization theory claims that in more decentralized 
contexts local governments will provide to local residents public services more efficiently and more 
adherent to citizens’ preferences. In addition, the strong theoretical argument in favour of regional 
autonomy put forward by political economy theorizing on decentralization is that it will improve the 
accountability and responsiveness of the local governments (Faguet, 2014; Weingast, 2014). As 
Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2011) put it, the primary aim of decentralization has never been about 
delivering greater economic growth, lowing inequality or increasing social capital; rather, “the 
original aim of decentralization is fundamentally to improve the delivering of public goods and 
services to individuals and, consequently, the level of satisfaction of the population with 
government” (p. 2, our emphasis). As the authors argue, this argument has been largely overlooked 
by the literature. 
Another problem related to country-level analysis is that it tends to overlook the presence of 
heterogeneity both in the quality of local public services and in the degree of regional autonomy 
within the countries. Concerning the former, as we will show, the variability within country is not 
negligible, and in some cases it is substantial (Charron et al., 2014). Concerning  the degree of 
regional autonomy, some countries are characterized by asymmetric federalism in that they exhibit 
differences in the degree of autonomy of their sub-national governments (Congleton et al., 2003). 
Also in these cases within country differences are quite sizeable. For instance, in Spain, specific 
arrangements have been made for Navarra and Basque communities regarding financial autonomy, 
while Galicia and Catalonia have special authority over education, language and culture; in the 
United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales are also more autonomous, and the Scottish Parliament has 
significant more autonomy in policy making than the Welsh Parliament; other examples are the 
presence of a few autonomous regions with stronger autonomy in Italy and Portugal. 
Our second contribution lies in the empirical method employed. We employ a novel dose-response 
approach whose merit is that of overcoming some limits of traditional regression models (Cerulli, 
2015a). In particular, dose-response models: (1) allow for going beyond the (single) average effect by 
providing an estimation of the effect in the form of a function (i.e., the dose-response function) 
defined along the values taken by the dose variable; (2) offer a clear-cut and easy-to-read graphical 
representation of results based on the plot of the dose-response function, thus making clearer the 
pattern of the causal link under analysis; (3) allow to study the entire distribution of the causal 
effect, thereby providing grounds for a more precise understanding of the observed pattern of the 
treatment effect.    
An important issue is that of measuring the quality of local public services and the level of regional 
autonomy. In order to measure the former at the regional level we employ a composite indicator 
developed by The QOG Institute based on the citizens’ perception about local public services (Quality 
of Government Institute, 2010; Charron and Lapuente, 2011). As far as the level of regional 
autonomy is concerned, we employ the Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe et al. 
(2008a); these two indicators have a number of strengths and have been increasingly employed in 
this type of studies (e.g. Charron et al., 2014; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents our key measures, while Section 
three introduces our empirical strategy. Section four presents and discusses the results; Section five 
finally concludes.  
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2 Data: measuring the quality of local public services and the level of 
regional autonomy 
The quality of local public services 
Several empirical studies have employed indirect measures of government quality, such as for 
instance outcomes in education or public works, public deficit, the degree of corruption, infant 
mortality (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Faguet, 2014; 
Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Several others have instead used the WGI Indicator developed by the World 
Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2011), which assesses the citizens’ perception of government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (e.g. Bartolini and Santolini, 2012; Kyriacou 
and Roca-Sagalés, 2011; O’Dwyer and Ziblatt, 2006). In line with this approach we employ a measure 
of the quality of local public services provided by the Quality of Government Survey (Charron et al., 
2014; Quality of Government Institute, 2010) based on the citizens’ perception of three local public 
services: education, health and law enforcement.3 These are also those public services that are 
usually investigated in decentralization studies (Sacchi and Salotti, 2014). 
The indicator - regqog - is a perception-based indicator built from a 34,000-respondents survey from 
172 regions within 18 EU member states; to date, this constitutes one of the most comprehensive 
surveys about the quality of local public goods at the sub-national level. 4 The survey was undertaken 
between 15 December, 2009, and 1 February, 2010 and consisted of 34 questions to the 
approximately 200 respondents per region. Respondents were asked about three general public 
services in their regions – education, health care and law enforcement. In focusing on these three 
services, respondents were asked to rate their public services with respect to three related concepts, 
namely the quality, impartiality and an inverse measure of the level of corruption of these services 
(the complete questionnaire can be found in the Appendix of Quality of Government Institute, 
2010). The Survey also provides a single QoG index for each region obtained by averaging the three 
pillars - quality, impartiality and (lack of) corruption, each weighted 1/3rd. In our analysis we are 
going to use both the overall qog index performance as well as the three pillars.5 The data have been 
standardized such that the EU regional mean is ‘0’ and has a standard deviation of ‘1’. A series of 
extensive sensitivity tests to see whether changes in the model alter the final data was done. It 
arises that “data constructed here are highly robust to multiple changes in weighting and 
aggregation schemes, the removal of individual questions or alterations in the demographic make-
up of the respondents” (Quality of Government Institute, 2010).  
The Report suggests the presence of significant within-country variation from country to country 
(see Figure 1). As explained by Charron and Lapuente (2011) the data show that the indicator of QoG 
is either equally or more important than variation between EU countries themselves. For example, 
some regions in Italy and Belgium perform like those in the best performing countries, while others 
                                                          
3 We want to thank Nicolas Charron and Victor Lapuente of ‘The QOG Institute’ of the University of Goteborg 
for their assistance with data issues. See also Charron, Nicholas, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo 
Rothstein, Anna Khomenko & Richard Svensson. 2016. The Quality of Government EU Regional Dataset, 
version Sep16. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se. 
4 Note that the authors call this index “quality of government index” since they use the provision of local public 
goods as a proxy for the quality of regional government. Our focus here is instead on the quality of local public 
services themselves, exploiting the heterogeneity in their organizational structure across regions. 
5 In the paper we will refer to overall performance to refer to the overall index, and to quality to refer to the 
single pillar ‘quality’. 
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rank similarly to low-performing regions in Hungary and Greece. This reinforces the need of going 
beyond national level when analysing this issue. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The second point that is worth noting is the connection of regional QoG and regional autonomy. The 
level of regional variation within the country is not highly correlated to the degree of regional 
autonomy. It is easy to check that there is large variation within highly centralized countries 
(Portugal) as well as in highly decentralized countries (Belgium). Conversely, one can also observe 
low variation in the regqog index both in centralized countries (Denmark) and decentralized ones 
(Germany).  
The degree of regional autonomy 
Measuring decentralization is also not that straightforward. Most of the studies use the share of sub-
national revenues (or expenditures) on total revenues (expenditure) as a proxy for the degree of 
decentralization, namely fiscal decentralization. There are a number of problems associated to these 
measures since they tends to overestimate the degree of fiscal autonomy (Stegarescu, 2005). In 
addition, they disregard the multifaceted nature of decentralization in that they take into account 
only the financial dimension, while in fact countries’ functioning in terms of distribution of power, 
responsibility, and resources among different tiers of government is defined also by administrative 
and political decentralization (Sacchi and Salotti, 2014). 
In order to take these problems into account, we employ a comprehensive measure of regional 
autonomy, the Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al., 2008; Marks et al., 2008), which 
includes fiscal, political, and administrative measures of the authority of a regional government. This 
index has been used in these types of studies replacing measures of fiscal expenditures as proxy of 
decentralization (e.g. Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). The 
Regional Authority Index – rai - measures the authority of regional governments in 42 democracies 
or quasi-democracies on an annual basis over the period 1950–2006. The countries included are 
twenty-nine OECD countries, the 27 countries that are members of the European Union, plus 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, and Serbia and Montenegro.  
The rai is formed by two components, which capture respectively the degree of authority exerted by 
a regional government over its territory (self-rule) and over the whole country (shared-rule). Self-rule 
regards the degree of independence of the regional government from the influence of central 
authorities and the scope of regional decision-making. In turn, shared-rule measures the capacity of 
the regional government to determine central decision-making. It is worth stressing that despite the 
name of the indicator, the rai refers not only to administrative decentralization but it also 
encompasses measures of political and fiscal decentralization. As such, it is possibly the most 
comprehensive indicator of regional autonomy that has been so far developed. 
In figure 2 we plot the degree of regional autonomy and sub-national variation as an average over 
the period 2000-2006.6 Large differences in the degree of regional autonomy arise between 
                                                          
6 In our analysis we would use the average level of 2000-2006. In fact, the rai variable changes extremely 
slowly over time, so that there are negligible variations over the last decade. This makes the results of our 
estimations robust to different values of the rai index over time. We also test our models by using earlier 
values of rai with no significant changes in the results. 
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European countries, in particular federal-types countries such as Austria, Belgium, and Germany 
stand out with high figures. As for sub-national variation, a quite mixed picture emerges. Several 
countries show no variation, while others show moderate variation (e.g. Belgium, Spain, and Italy), 
as well as high variation (e.g. Portugal and United Kingdom).    
[Figure 2 about here] 
3 Methodology 
In this paper, we are interested in studying the causal effect of regional autonomy (rai) on the 
overall performance of local public goods (regqog). To this purpose, we rely on the econometric 
literature on treatment effects estimation (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), and more specifically on 
that estimating dose-response models (Bia and Mattei, 2008; Cerulli, 2015a; Guardabascio and 
Ventura, 2013; Hirano and Imbens, 2004; Adorno et al., 2007). Dose-response models are well suited 
in socio-economic contexts where a “cause” takes the form of a continuous exposure to a certain 
treatment. 
In such a setting what matters is not only the binary treatment status of observations (i.e., treated 
vs. untreated), but also the level of exposure (or “dose”) undergone. This is also in tune with the 
language of epidemiology, where dose-response functions are usually estimated in order to check 
patients’ resilience to different levels of drug administration (Royston et al., 2010). 
Dose-response models have relevant advantages compared to traditional regression models: (1) 
they allow for going beyond the (single) average effect, by providing an estimation of the effect in 
the form of a function (i.e., the dose-response function) defined along the values taken by the dose 
variable; (2) they offer a clear-cut and easy-to-read graphical representation of results based on the 
plot of the dose-response function, thus making more clear the pattern of the causal link under 
analysis; (3) they allow to study the entire distribution of the causal effect, thereby providing 
grounds for a more precise understanding of the observed pattern of the treatment effect; (4) 
finally, they are embedded in a counterfactual design, lending to results a more reliable causal 
interpretation7.    
In this paper we are interested in estimating the causal effect of the dose variable rai on an outcome 
regqog y, by assuming that units may respond differently both to specific observable confounders 
(that we collect in a vector x), and to the “intensity” of the treatment rai. We wish to estimate a 
dose-response function of regqog on rai, when the treatment is assumed to be conditionally 
exogenous, namely, when selection-into-treatment depends only on observable-to-analyst factors.   
We briefly present the model by setting out with some notation. This part draws on the econometric 
model developed by Cerulli (2015), which also includes a Stata 14 implementation via the user-
written command ctreatreg. Consider two different and exclusive outcomes: one referring to a 
unit i when it is treated, y1i; and one referring to the same unit when it is untreated, y0i. Define wi as 
the treatment indicator, taking value 1 for treated and 0 for untreated units, and xi = (x1i, x2i,  x3i, ... , 
                                                          
7 In this application of the model all units are treated. However, rescaling the treatment variable to vary 
between zero and one naturally leads to identify units with zero treatment. This does not create problems, as 
in a continuous treatment setting, each treatment level rely on many counterfactuals, i.e. one for each level 
taken by the continuous treatment variable. In this sense, the zero treatment is in this case just one of many 
counterfactual states in which a given unit is placed.   
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xMi)  as a row vector of M exogenous and observable characteristics (confounders) for unit i = 1, ... , 
N. Let N be the number of units involved in the experiment, N1 be the number of treated units, and 
N0 the number of untreated units with N = N1 + N0. 
Define two distinct functions, g1(xi) and g0(xi), as the unit i’s responses to the vector of confounding 
variables xi when the unit is treated and untreated respectively. Assume μ1 and μ0 to be two scalars, 
and e1 and e0 two random variables having zero unconditional mean and constant variance. Finally, 
define ti – taking values within the continuous range [0; 100] – as the continuous-treatment 
indicator, and h(ti) as a general derivable function of ti. In what follows, in order to simplify notation, 
we’ll get rid of the subscript i when defining population quantities and relations. 
Given previous notation, we assume a specific population generating process for the two exclusive 
potential outcomes8:    
 
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
1:   ( ) ( )
0 :  ( )
w y g h t e
w y g e


        
x
x
 
 
(1) 
 
where the h(t) function is different from zero only in the treated status. Given this, we can also 
define the causal parameters of interests. Indeed, by defining the treatment effect as the difference 
TE = (y1 – y0), we can define the causal parameters of interests as the population Average Treatment 
Effects (ATEs) conditional on x and t, that is: 
  
1 0
1 0
1 0
ATE( ; ) E( | , )
ATET( ; 0) E( | , 0)
ATENT( ; 0) E( | , 0)
t y y t
t y y t
t y y t
 
   
   
x x
x x
x x
 
 
(2) 
 
where ATE indicates the overall average treatment effect, ATET the average treatment effect on 
treated, and ATENT the one on untreated units. By the law of iterated expectation (LIE), we know 
that the population unconditional ATEs are obtained as: 
 
( ; )
( ; 0)
( ; 0)
ATE = E {ATE( ; )}
ATET = E {ATE( ; 0)}
ATENT = E {ATE( ; 0)}
t
t
t
t
t
t




x
x
x
x
x
x
 
 
( 3) 
 
                                                          
8 Such a model is the representation of a treatment random coefficient regression as showed by Wooldridge 
(1997; 2003). See also Wooldridge (2010, Ch. 18). 
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where Ez(∙) identifies the mean operator taken over the support of a generic vector of variables z. By 
assuming a linear-in-parameters form for 0( )g  0x xδ  and 1 1( )g x xδ , the Average Treatment 
Effect (ATE) conditional on x and t becomes: 
 
ATE( , , ) [ ( )] (1 ) [ ]t w w h t w        x xδ xδ
 
(4) 
 
where μ=(μ1–μ0), δ=(δ1 – δ0), and the unconditional Average Treatment Effect (ATE) related to model 
(1) is equal to: 
 
0 0 0ATE = ( 1) ( ) ( 0) ( )t t tp w h p w          x δ x δ  
 
where p(∙) is a probability, and 0th    is the average of the response function taken over t>0. Since, by 
LIE, we have that ATE = p(w=1)∙ATET + p(w=0)∙ATENT, we obtain from the previous formula that:  
 
0 0 0
0 0
0
ATE ( 1)( ) ( 0)( )
ATET
ATENT
 


  
 

            
t t t
t t
t
p w h p w
h
x δ x δ
x δ
x δ
 
 
(5) 
 
where the dose-response function is given by averaging ATE(x, t) over x: 
 
 
0ATET ( ( ) )    if    0ATE( )
ATENT                       if    0
th t h tt
t
     
 
 
(6) 
  
that is a function of the treatment intensity t. 
We consider the conditions for a consistent estimation of the causal parameters defined in (2) and 
(3) and thus of the dose-response function in (6). What it is firstly needed, however, is a consistent 
estimation of the parameters of the potential outcomes in (1) – we call here “basic” parameters – as 
both ATEs and the dose-response function are functions of these parameters.  
10 
 
Under previous definitions and assumptions, and in particular the form of the potential outcomes in 
model (1), to be substituted into Rubin’s potential outcome equation 0 1 0( ),i i i iy y w y y    the 
following baseline random-coefficient regression can be obtained (Wooldridge, 2003; Wooldridge, 
1997): 
 
0 ATE ( ) ( ( ) )i i i i i i i iy w w w h t h           0x δ x x δ
 
 
(7) 
where 
0 1 0( )i i i i ie w e e      
 
The equation sets out in (12), provides the baseline regression for estimating the basic parameters 
(μ0, μ1, δ0, δ1, ATE) and then all the remaining ATEs. Both a semi-parametric or a parametric 
approach can be employed as soon as a parametric or a non-parametric form of the function h(t) is 
assumed. In both cases, however, in order to get a consistent estimation of basic parameters, we 
need some additional hypotheses. In this paper, we assume Unconfoundedness or Conditional Mean 
Independence (CMI), sufficient to provide parameters’ consistent estimation. Unconfoundedness 
states that, conditional on the knowledge of the true exogenous confounders x, the conditions for 
randomization are restored and causal parameters become identifiable. Given the set of random 
variables {y1i, y1i, wi, xi} as defined above, Unconfoundedness (or CMI) implies that: 
 
E(yji | wi , xi) = E(yji | xi)    with  j = {0,1} 
 
CMI is a sufficient condition for identifying ATEs and the dose-response function in this context. 
Indeed, this assumption entails that, given the observable variables collected in x, both w and t are 
exogenous in equation (7), so that we can write the regression line of the response y simply as: 
 
0E( | , , ) ATE ( ) ( ( ) )i i i i i i i i i iy w t w w w h t h         0x x δ x x δ
 
 
 
(8) 
and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be used to retrieve consistent estimation of all parameters. 
Once a consistent estimation of the parameters in (8) is obtained, we can estimate ATE directly from 
this regression, and ATET, ATENT and the dose-response function by plugging the estimated basic 
parameters into formula (5) and (6). This is possible because these parameters are functions of 
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consistent estimates, and thus consistent themselves. Observe that standard errors for ATET and 
ATENT can be correctly obtained via bootstrapping (Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 911–919). 
To complete the identification of ATEs and that of the dose-response function, we finally assume a 
parametric form for h(t): 
 
2 3( )i i i ih t at bt ct    (9) 
 
where a, b, and c are parameters to be estimated in regression (8). 
Under CMI, an OLS estimation of equation (8) produces consistent estimates of the parameters, we 
indicate as 0
ˆˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ, ,ATE, , , , .a b c 0δ δ  With these parameters at hand, we can finally estimate 
consistently the dose-response function as:  
 
2 2 3 3
1 1 1
1 1 1ˆˆ ˆATE( ) [ATET ( ) ( ) ( )] (1 )ATENT
N N N
i i i i i i i
i i i
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          
 
 
(10) 
 
where: 
0ATET( ) ATE( ) ii i tt t
 
  
 
A simple plot of the curve 0ATE( ) ii tt

  over the support of t returns the pattern of the dose-
response function. Moreover, for each level of the dose t, it is also possible to calculate the α-
confidence interval around the dose-response curve. Indeed, by defining T1=t-E(t), T2=t2-E(t2) and T3= 
t3-E(t3), the standard error of the dose-response function is equal to9: 
 
 1/ 22 2 2 2 2 21 2 3 1 2 , 1 3 , 2 3 ,
ATE( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 2 2a b c a b a c b c
t
T T T TT TT T T            
                             (11) 
This means that the α-confidence interval of ˆATE( )t  for each t is then given by: 
 
                                                          
9 This comes from the variance/covariance properties where T1 T2 T3 are taken as constant and a, b and c as 
random variables. 
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 / 2 ATE( )ˆ ˆ ATE( ) tt Z     
 
that can be usefully plotted along the dose-response curve for detecting visually the statistical 
significance of the treatment effect along the support of the dose t.  
 
4 Results 
Regional autonomy and the quality of local public services 
In this section we present the results of the dose-response analysis (see tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix for the list of variables and the correlation table). Table 1 reports the OLS robust estimates 
of equation (7). There are four models reported in the table, each corresponding to a different 
dependent variable. In the first model we employ the overall measure of performance of local public 
services, i.e. the regqog index, while in the second, third and fourth model we employ each of the 
pillars composing the index, which are respectively impartiality, lack of corruption, and quality of 
local services (health, education and the police force). Our key explanatory variable is the rai index 
which has been re-scaled to take values between 0 and 100.10 
Several control variables, all at the region level, are included, namely: income per capita (here 
measured in PPP); three dummies variable controlling for i) bilingual region; ii) autonomous region; 
iii) capital region; the (log of) population and size (log of the area). Both bilingual regions and capital 
region variables are also meant to control for the presence of different ethnic minorities and 
migration inflows. These two factors, as discussed below, can play a role especially concerning the 
impartiality of local public services. A customary variable which is taken into account in political 
economy studies is the presence of strong and independent media, since they are considered an 
important channel through which citizens can keep the local policy makers under control. For this 
reason we have included the variable ‘presence of independent media’ which reflects “the strength 
and effectiveness of the media in the region to expose corruption” and is part of the same QOG 
Survey. We also include the variable “share of population with tertiary education” taken from 
Eurostat to control for the level of education of the regional population. On the one hand, higher 
level of education is expected to be positively correlated with the performance of local services 
because of a sorting effect, as a result of which better educated people tend to concentrate in areas 
with better services. On the other hand, the level of education can also affect the perception of the 
public services since better educated people can be more informed and more demanding. 
Therefore, the effect could be either positive or negative depending on the prevalence of the two 
effects. Finally, a variable taking into account the diverse composition of the population – a diversity 
                                                          
10 The pairwise correlation between the qog index and its three pillars is reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
We have performed the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to detect the presence of multicollinearity. The 
results are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix which show no concerns about multicollinearity, being all VIFs 
smaller than 10. We have also performed a country fixed effects, obtained by introducing a dummy variable 
for each country; by excluding the country fixed effects from our baseline model as in column 1, we lose 
approximately around 23% of the total variance of our dependent variable explained by the country fixed-
effect model. 
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index – was included, in order to take into account the fact that the regional segregation of ethnic or 
linguistic groups is expected to lead to lower government quality (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; 
Kyriacou, 2012). Following the approach developed by Ozgen et al. (2011) our diversity index is 
calculated as follows: (1 - Herfindal index of nationality shares). Based on the census of 2011, 11 the 
index considers three types of population: native citizens, foreign EU residents, and foreign non-EU 
residents.12 As expected our diversity index shows regions such as London, Brussels and Vienna as 
those with the higher scores, and regions from Romania and Poland as those with lowest scores.  
In this kind of setting spatial correlation can play an important role. A calculation of the Moran index 
reveals the presence of a positive spatial correlation in the performance of local public services, with 
an index equal to 0.853, significant at 0.01 per cent (see Table A4 in the Appendix). In order to 
control for spatial correlation effects, we have introduced the variable contiguity spillover which is 
built as a contiguity matrix weighted for the rai index. More precisely, it represents the average 
value of the rai index of the regions that are contiguous to the region I, and belong to the same 
country. The reason for introducing this variable is grounded on a prominent argument of fiscal 
decentralization theory, which is the role of horizontal competition among local governments. In 
brief, the idea is that one of the important side-effects of decentralization is that it encourages 
virtuous competition among neighbours’ regional governments. If citizens (and companies) can ‘vote 
with their feet’ they would be inclined to move to regions that are better governed, i.e. where public 
services are better provided (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 2003; Binet, 2003). In fact, 
citizens tend to judge their politicians not only by looking at their absolute performance but also by 
comparing their performance to those of neighbours’ politicians that they can easily observe. 
According to these arguments, in a more decentralized settings horizontal competition among 
regional government should improve policy makers’ incentives in providing good local public goods. 
We therefore expect the related coefficient to show a positive sign.  
Finally, we introduce two control variables at the country level. Firstly, a dummy variable for regions 
belonging to EU-15 Member countries is introduced. Secondly, the quality of local public services can 
also depend on the actual amount of resources which are available to regional governments, other 
than their level of autonomy. In order to take this into account, we introduce a standard measure of 
tax decentralization, measured as the share of sub-central governments’ own tax revenues on 
general government total tax revenues (as in Filippetti and Sacchi, 2016). 
The results in Table 1 across the four models suggest, as expected, a positive impact of per capita 
income on the overall performance of regional governments, as well as on the three pillars of the 
index. Being a bilingual region is negatively associated to corruption and quality of public services. 
Capital region is negatively correlated with public services across the all models, but significant only 
for corruption; this possibly depending on congestion effects and the presence of most national 
governments’ offices in these regions. A similar effect can also justify the negative effect of 
population, and, for opposite reasons, the positive effect of the size. The presence of strong and 
independent media in the region is positively correlated with the quality of local public service 
(model 4). The share of population with tertiary education arises as negatively associated with public 
services, especially overall performance and corruption. We can interpret this result considering that 
                                                          
11 Data can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/CensusHub2/query.do?step=selectHyperCube&qhc=false. 
12 Note that adding up the share of “stateless” population leaves the index virtually unchanged. 
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the sorting effect is already captured by per capita income, and therefore the negative association 
with the provision of public services of well-educated people might depend on the fact the latter 
tend to be more demanding and better informed. As expected, and in line with empirical evidence 
mentioned above, our diversity index suggests that more diverse environments are associated with 
lower perceived quality of the provision of public services, possibly depending to the negative effect 
of segregation on inter-group trust (Kyriacou, 2012). Finally, the variable country tax decentralization 
is positively correlated in the first three models, but negatively with the quality of local services. 
Regarding the correlation between regional autonomy and the four dependent variables, the binary 
autonomy treatment is negative and highly significant in the first and in the third model, thus 
suggesting a negative correlation between regional autonomy and the overall performance of local 
public services and corruption. Our binary treatment variable is a dummy taking 1 for all the regions, 
except those exhibiting the lowest score of regional autonomy (taking 0), that in our sample are 
mainly Bulgarian and Portuguese regions. As a result, the obtained value of ATE should not be 
strictly interpreted as a general counterfactual result. This is not a serious limitation nonetheless, as 
our main goal is to focus on the pattern of our dependent variable along a continuous scale of 
regional autonomy, i.e. ATE(t), which is independent of the value at t=0 where our binary treatment 
is zero too.   
The effect of regional autonomy on local public goods along a continuous scale is reported in the 
charts in Figure 3, each corresponding to a model in Table 1. The four charts display the dose-
response functions, which are the patterns of the impact of the treatment – regional autonomy – on 
our indicator of overall performance of regional governments and its three pillars. For each model, 
estimations in Table 1 report both each single polynomial coefficient (Tw_1, Tw_2, and Tw_3) as well 
as the join test of their significance in order to accept or reject the shape of the dose-response 
function as depicted in the charts. The tests suggest that we can accept the shape of the distribution 
for all models except that for model 3 relative to corruption.13 
The chart relative to overall performance of local public services - the regqog index - exhibits a u-
shaped form. This seems to suggest that in regions with either low autonomy or high autonomy, 
citizens’ satisfaction in the provision of local public services surges. By contrast, the central area, 
where the level of regional autonomy is moderate exhibits a negative association with the 
performance of local public services. The second chart reports the dose-response function for the 
pillar impartiality. 14 The distribution suggests a high level of impartiality for less autonomous 
regions, a low level in the middle and then again a rise in the level of impartiality; for values higher 
than 80 the estimation is no longer significant. In fact, in this curve there are several areas in which 
                                                          
13 Observe that it is perfectly possible either that single coefficients significance tests accept the null for each 
coefficient, while the joint test of significance leads to reject equality to zero, or vice versa. Indeed, the single 
parameters combined confidence region (bases on T-students) is a rectangular area, whereas the joint-test 
confidence region (based on the F-test) is an ellipse. Therefore, they do not overlap perfectly.   
14 It is important to recall here how the concept of impartiality is captured by the index. The study takes two 
complementary approaches. With a first set of questions, citizens are asked to rate whether they agreed that 
‘certain people’ get special advantages when dealing with the public service in question from 0 (strongly 
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). With a second set of questions citizens are asked whether all people in their 
region are ‘treated equally’ by the service in question on a four point scale (Agree, rather agree, rather 
disagree or Disagree); for details see (Quality of Government Institute, 2010). 
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the upper and lower bounding curves cross the 0, therefore the shape should be interpreted with 
caution.  
The third chart displays the dose-response function of regional autonomy on an inverse measure of 
corruption. In this case we observe a clear negative pattern; in fact, the joint tests reported in Table 
1 suggest this distribution to be a straight line. This entails that a higher level of regional autonomy is 
negatively correlated with the performance of local public services in terms of corruption. Results on 
the impact of decentralization on corruption are quite mixed (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Lederman et 
al., 2005). On the one hand it is argued that decentralization, by improving the accountability of 
policy makers, reduces the incentives for corruption. On the other hand, local politicians can be 
more prone to be captured by local groups of interests. Our results are moderately consistent with 
this latter view. 
The fourth chart is related to the perceived quality of local public services. A u-shaped arises 
suggesting high quality in the provision of local public services both for less autonomous regions and 
for highly autonomous regions. It should be noted that the left-side and right-side extremes are not 
statistically significant. In principle, the area which is statistically significant is that between 45 and 
80. Having said that, we can cautiously posit that this result is consistent with both the view 
regarding the relationship between the quality of local public good and regional autonomy. On the 
one hand, better performance the quality of local public good of centralized institutional settings is 
argued to derive from by the presence of spillover effects and economies of scale, and the need for 
central coordination. On the other hand, standard arguments in favour of decentralization argue 
that governments closer to the citizens will provide public services which are closer to the 
preferences of citizens. Importantly, our evidence points to a lower quality of local public services 
associated to middle-range levels of regional autonomy. 
[Table 1 about here] 
  [Figure 3 about here] 
Summing up, in this section we have highlighted two important results about the relationship 
between regional autonomy and local public services. Firstly, we have not detected the presence of 
one optimal level or area of regional autonomy for good governments, since the relationship 
between regional autonomy and the overall performance of local public services is not monotonic: 
both low regional autonomy and high regional autonomy are associated to higher levels of 
performance of local public services. Secondly, by looking at all the charts together one can observe 
that the regions that are in a middle ground area perform systematically poorer: this suggests the 
presence of a sort of ‘no man’s land’ where neither the benefits of centralization nor the benefits 
decentralization are fully internalized.  
The presence of a u-shaped relationship between regional authority and the performance of local 
public services can be interpreted by relying on two main arguments. One is the classic problem of 
the division of competences between the different levels of government in multi-level institutional 
environments. Our results suggest that both unitary institutional settings and highly-decentralized 
institutional settings are more effective in solving the several conflicts (or agency problems) that 
might arise between central and regional governments (Besley and Coate, 2003; Bird, 1993). The bad 
performance of regions characterized by average levels of regional authority can be explained as a 
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consequence of overlapping competences that generate conflicts between different levels of 
government, which are likely to arise especially when fiscal federalism is pursued without 
establishing a clear division of political and administrative competences among them.  
This is the case for instance for the so-called concurrent competences between the central 
government and the regions. A case in point is the decentralization reform introduced in Italy in 
2001, whereas the fiscal federalism associated with a lack of devolution of clear competences to 
regional governments and the presence of several concurrent competences have generated major 
conflicts between regional and central government policy making. Since the introduction of the 
reform up to 2014 some 871 regional laws have been brought by the central government to the 
Constitutional Court. This has severely impaired the efficient functioning of the reform, and, as a 
consequence, on many of these issues the current government is bringing back competences from 
the regions to the central government. France is another case in point. Apart from the regions and 
departments, France has some 36,777 municipalities, some included into the 2,500 intercommunal 
grouping, while the central government is represented by 100 local prefectures and more than 200 
sub-prefectures. This structure is often referred to as an administrative “mille-feuille (thousand-
layer) cake”.15 This has led to multiple overlapping of functions in several areas which is often 
considered as a major obstacle to efficiency of local governments (Carnegy, 2014).    
The problem of overlapping competence among several layers of government can be exacerbated by 
a lack of political decentralization. A lack of political responsibility might facilitate capture by local 
lobbies (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000), while strong political accountability favor greater 
accountability and responsiveness of local governments (Faguet, 2004) and public policies that are 
more suited to local heterogeneous preferences (Bird, 1993). This depends on the fact that in the 
case of strong political decentralization, politicians face a set of strong incentives that are aligned to 
the incentives of the citizens. In cases of partial decentralization, when both the central and the local 
governments share the responsibility for the provision of some local public services, several issues 
can make the functioning of the institutional system inefficient. In these cases the ability of voters to 
keep politicians in check is limited. Further, partial decentralization can give raise to vertical strategic 
interaction between the different levels of governments (Joanis, 2014). In fact, the problem of 
shared responsibility and its consequence on political accountability has been recognized to play a 
relevant role in explaining several cases in which decentralization reforms have led to a 
disappointing outcome (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Khemani, 2010).      
By looking at the overall picture, countries seem to be confronted with two different options in 
terms of the distribution of political power and fiscal autonomy among their levels of governments 
which are both conducive to good local public services provision. This is consistent with a lack of 
convergence in the degree of decentralization that we can observe across countries. Even though a 
general trend towards decentralization has taken place over the past decades, significant difference 
are still present. In fact, one can see countries characterized by good performance of local public 
services provision but showing at the same time sizeable difference along the degree of 
decentralisation, such as federal states like Austria and Germany on the one hand, and the 
Scandinavian countries on the other hand.  
                                                          
15 We are indebted with Marc Graham for this insight. 
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Three robustness exercises 
A possible problem with our data is that of comparing regions which differ remarkably, namely those 
belonging to the EU-15 countries and those belonging to the New Member countries from the 
Eastern European countries. A part from the stage of development (which we were able to control 
for by using the levels of per capita income), it should be noted that the local governments in New 
Member countries are still in their infancy, although the European cohesion policy has encouraged 
their active role within the multi-level governance framework (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This is also 
reflected in their low level of regional autonomy. For these reasons we have repeated the same 
exercise restricting the sample to the 126 EU-15 regions (the regressions reported in Table 6A in the 
Appendix).  
Figure 4 reports the charts corresponding to each of the model estimates in Table 6A. In this case, all 
the joint tests of significance on the polynomial coefficients reject the null hypothesis that they are 
jointly equal to zero. Therefore, these results are close to those obtained using the whole sample, 
with the shape of the plotted dose-response functions to be taken as satisfactorily reliable. The u-
shape arising from the first model is still present, and, if anything, even more clear cut. By looking at 
the impartiality of public good management, a similar shape arises, with two maximum at both low 
and high degree of autonomy. As in the previous case, a negative pattern for corruption arises. Also 
for the quality the curve looks similar, although now the area which is statistically significant is 
broader thus reinforcing the u-shape effect previously observed. 
 [Figure 4 about here] 
A second robustness exercise addresses the different timing of decentralization reforms. In fact, 
countries in our sample have introduced decentralization in different times. Some have been federal 
states for several decades, such as Germany, while others have carried out decentralization reforms 
more recently, such as Italy and Spain. Therefore, it could be argued that there are differences in the 
quality of local public services that depends on the fact that some of them have developed a greater 
maturity in managing their autonomy, while others have not yet. This in turn can depend on the 
development of a more experienced local political class, on the need to adjust the whole 
administrative structure of States, as well as on the capacity of the citizens themselves to monitor 
and put pressure on local officers. In addition, this attempt to take into account reverses causality. It 
is possible that regions that are more developed and with more efficient institutions could ask for 
higher autonomy; this is indeed one of reasons why some rich regions, as for instance in Spain and 
Italy, have been claiming greater autonomy in the recent past. In order to control for this possible 
bias, we have run the same estimates as in Table 1 using earlier valued of rai, namely 1980 (we had 
to rely on 1990 values of rai for regions belonging to the Eastern European countries). The shapes of 
the distributions do not change significantly, so they are not reported here. 
In the third robustness exercise we rely on the self-rule component of the rai index. In so doing we 
are going to focus on one dimension of regional autonomy, that concerning the degree of 
independence of the regional government from the influence of central authorities and the scope of 
regional decision-making; by contrast, we are instead not considering the capacity of the regional 
government to determine central decision-making, which is a typical feature of regional government 
in federal countries.  
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Figure 5 below report charts corresponding to each of the model estimates in Table 7A. The results 
are remarkably different from those presented in Figure 3. All the curves exhibit a negative slope, 
suggesting a negative effect of increasing autonomy on the performance of public service and all its 
components. In fact, the correlation between the overall rai index and the self-rule index is equal to 
0.84, thus suggesting some non negligible difference between the two. By looking at the two 
indexes, one can observe that the regions scoring high on self-rule, and low - or moderately-low - on 
shared rule, are some regions in Spain and Italy. These countries do not have a proper federal 
constitution, although their institutional settings are regionalist. By contrast, regions from federal 
countries such as those in Germany and Belgium are those scoring high in shared-rule. Hence, one 
way to interpret our results is that the positive effect of regional autonomy that we can see in the 
curve in Figure 3, and that disappears in Figure 5, is driven by regions that retain high autonomy 
both in the self-rule and in the shared-rule indicators, that is those regions belonging to federal 
countries. Therefore, the capacity of the regional government to determine central decision-making 
seems to matter for improving the performance of public services. The lack (or weakness) of the 
institutional component of regional autonomy seems to play an important role in explaining the bad 
performance of autonomous regions in delivering public services.    
 [Figure 5 about here] 
5 Conclusion 
This paper tests a central prediction formulated by the theory of decentralization and fiscal 
federalism according to which more autonomous regional governments should perform better in the 
provisions of local public services. It attempts to inform this key issue by making two contributions. 
Firstly, it addresses this issue at the region level for the first time (to our knowledge). As said, this is a 
call coming from the theory itself: if the fiscal federalism theory is right, this should be reflected first 
and foremost in the provision of local public good and in the activity of local governments (Diaz-
Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011). Secondly, it proposes a novel dose-response method which is 
employed in this context for the first time. Compared to traditional regression models, our method 
allows us to investigate the entire pattern of the effect of regional autonomy on the performance of 
local public services.  
There are limitations that need to be discussed in some detail. In order to carry out the analysis at 
the region level we had to rely on the first measure of decentralization developed at the region level 
(the raireg index). This measure captures differences in the autonomy within countries which in 
several cases are significant. However, an important limitation of this measure is that in some 
countries there is no variation, since the regional governments have all the same level of autonomy; 
this occurs both in federal countries and unitary countries. As a result, the variation in the treatment 
variable is quite limited, while dose-response approaches would be more reliable with a greater 
variability in the treatment variable. Secondly, when analysing local phenomena, the role of spatial 
correlation can play an important role. In our case, the performance of a region can be affected by 
that of the neighbour’s regional governments. Exploring this issue would have required a spatial 
autoregressive approach. Unfortunately, at this stage, this class of models cannot be implemented 
within our dose-response model. This is certainly an interesting methodological step forward, which 
could be worth developing.  
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Third, limitations should be discussed also with regard to the identification assumptions our dose-
response model relies upon. The first and more relevant of them is the assumption of conditional 
mean independence at any dose level, which implies that, at each dose, no unobservable 
confounders (i.e., variables having a simultaneous effect on treatment level and outcome) are 
supposed to exist. Whenever unobservables are present, this may lead to OLS biased estimates 
though. This would require the use of an instrumental-variables (IV) approach, which is even more 
biased than OLS in small samples with weak instruments (Cerulli, 2015b, pp. 175–180). As our setting 
and information does not provide “natural” instruments able to induce exogenous variation on the 
treatment (the so-called ‘intent-to-treatment’), we preferred to stick to OLS. In any case, our model 
specification includes a sufficiently large amount of meaningful control variables that – altogether – 
should allow us to limiting estimation noise induced by the presence of unobservables. Another 
limitation of our model is that it relies on a parametric specification of the potential outcomes. We 
were obliged to go into this direction as – to our knowledge – comparable non-parametric dose-
response models have not been developed yet.  As such, our approach can be included within the 
larger family of Regression Adjustment (RA) counterfactual methods, which are inherently 
parametric. The choice of interpolating a (global) polynomial function of the dose is however an 
attempt to relax at least the linearity of the model.  
Finally, the availability of data covering a longer span of time would allow delving into the causality 
issue in a more appropriate way. Summing up, our findings should not be taken as definitive in the 
relationship between autonomy and good governance. Quite the contrary, this study intends to be 
exploratory, in that it shows the room for improving our understanding of much complex 
phenomena employing both a finer inspection within the countries, as well as approaches which go 
beyond average measures such as for instance is that case of the average treatment effect in dose-
response approaches. 
Our evidence points to the presence of two areas of autonomy, corresponding to a highly-
centralized setting and a highly-decentralized setting, which exhibit a better provision of local public 
services, at least according to the citizens’ perception. This result militates against the presence of 
one ideal or optimal level of regional autonomy, and, consequently, against policy recommendations 
based on the view that more decentralization is always desirable. It is instead consistent with that 
stream of research in institutional economy and comparative political economy according to which 
different institutional settings can be economically viable and efficient (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
To this regard, this result is also a stimulus for further theoretical developments in this area which 
take into account the idea of institutional coherence (Amable, 2000): both unitary and decentralized 
institutional setting can provide local public services efficiently if the whole institutional structure – 
including the fiscal structure, the political responsibility, and the administrative organization - is 
properly designed accordingly. 
Three main implications can be derived. Firstly, the lack of convergence towards decentralized 
systems across countries is justified by the fact that both centralized and decentralized systems can 
deliver good policies and good public services (for a similar finding in a different context see Hall and 
Gingerich, 2009). We find no absolute superiority of decentralized systems of governance, at least 
concerning the provisions of local public services. Secondly, we can conclude that placing themselves 
in an intermediate position seems to be worse than being located in one of the two extremes (high 
centralization, or high decentralization). As a result, if a country is willing to carry out a 
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decentralization reform it should push this towards high levels of decentralization, avoiding being 
stuck in the middle of the road. Finally, our robustness analysis shows that the capacity of the 
regional government to determine central decision-makingis as much as important as the degree of 
independence of the regional government from the influence of central authorities and the scope of 
regional decision-making. 
A final note concerns the role of decentralization in a context in which the pace of immigration is 
increasing and it is likely to play a greater role in the future European society. As a result, the 
populations of European regions are becoming more heterogeneous, thus putting more pressure for 
more tailor-made and impartiality in the provisions of public services. Our evidence seems to 
suggest that, as much as decentralization is an effective answer to the demand for impartiality in 
public policy, immigration is likely to be another bottom-up element of pressure for devolving 
greater autonomy to regional and local governments in Europe. Countries characterized by high 
heterogeneity in the population, as for instance in the case of the presence of ethnic minorities, 
might attach greater importance to the impartiality of public service provision to ensure social 
stability and avoid tensions among citizens belonging to different groups; here decentralization 
would be a good option. This is an interesting avenue for future research. 
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Fig. 1. Regional quality of local public services (reggog) and sub-national variation 
 
Fig. 2. Degree of regional authority (rai) and sub-national variation 
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Table 1. Dose response function of regional autonomy on the performance of local public services and its three 
pillars– impartiality, lack of corruption, and quality of local services. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Index Impartiality Lack of corruption Quality 
Dichotomy decentralization treatment -0.633** 0.252 -0.756** 0.071 
 
(0.297) (0.308) (0.314) (0.301) 
     Income per capita 1.591*** 0.505* 1.329*** 1.143*** 
 
(0.235) (0.262) (0.262) (0.226) 
     Bilingual region 0.313 0.335 0.382* 0.305** 
 
(0.202) (0.282) (0.207) (0.140) 
     Autonomous region 0.0996 0.224 0.298 0.002 
 
(0.232) (0.290) (0.237) (0.192) 
     Capital region -0.298 -0.274 -0.627** -0.274 
 
(0.246) (0.237) (0.282) (0.185) 
     Population of the region -0.434*** -0.028 -0.252** -0.162 
 
(0.131) (0.114) (0.125) (0.112) 
     Size of the region 0.131** -0.022 -0.020 0.081 
 
(0.0635) (0.0693) (0.0700) (0.0535) 
     Eu15 -0.0656 -0.043 -0.313 -0.486* 
 
(0.293) (0.312) (0.325) (0.262) 
     Contiguity spillover 0.012 0.028 0.028 0.025 
 
(0.0200) (0.0209) (0.0199) (0.0159) 
     Presence of independent media -0.057 -0.082 0.088 0.660*** 
 
(0.0625) (0.0720) (0.0649) (0.0587) 
     Population with tertiary education -0.317** -0.128 -0.345** -0.144 
 
(0.135) (0.130) (0.142) (0.134) 
     Diversity index -1.373* -0.638 -1.300 -1.925*** 
 
(0.809) (1.088) (0.878) (0.591) 
     Country tax decentralization 0.017* 0.076*** 0.045*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0127) (0.0122) (0.00929) 
     Polynomial degree 1 (Tw_1) 0.0144 -0.187*** 0.0272 -0.0298 
 
(0.0271) (0.0412) (0.0348) (0.0285) 
Polynomial degree 2 (Tw_2) -0.000812 0.00359*** -0.000651 0.000159 
 
(0.000547) (0.000791) (0.000660) (0.000526) 
Polynomial degree 3 (Tw_3) 0.00000664** -0.0000206*** 0.00000321 0.00000101 
 
(0.00000325) (0.00000452) (0.00000379) (0.00000292) 
test _b[Tw_1]=_b[Tw_2]=_b[Tw_3]=0 rejected rejected accepted rejected 
 
Prob > F = 0.0048 Prob > F = 0.0001 Prob > F = 0.4937 Prob > F = 0.0006 
Observations 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.684 0.620 0.644 0.757 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Fig. 3. Dose response function of regional autonomy on the performance of local public services index and its three pillars – impartiality, lack of corruption, and quality of 
local services. 
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Fig. 4. Dose response function of regional autonomy on the quality of local public services index and its three pillars – impartiality, corruption, and quality of local services 
(EU-15 Member countries regions only). 
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Fig. 5. Dose response function of the self-rule pillar of regional autonomy on the quality of local public services index and its three pillars – impartiality, corruption, and 
quality of local services. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. List of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Euqogindex (overall) 171 0.000 1.003 -2.96 1.68 
Euqogindex (pillar impartiality) 171 -0.008 0.997 -2.58 2.04 
Euqogindex (pillar corruption) 171 -0.003 1.002 -3.13 2.22 
Euqogindex (pillar quality) 171 0.004 1.002 -3.58 2.07 
Regional authority index (rai) 171 49.020 28.189 0 100 
Income per capita (log) 171 9.874 0.623 8.00 11.01 
Bilingual region 171 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Autonomous region 171 0.088 0.284 0 1 
Capital region 171 0.105 0.308 0 1 
Population of the region (log) 171 7.557 0.890 4.79 9.80 
Size of the region (log) 171 9.526 1.112 5.08 12.65 
EU-15 region 171 0.737 0.442 0 1 
Contiguity spillover 171 9.824 6.173 0.00 21.00 
Presence of independent media 171 -0.003 1.002 -2.76 2.94 
Share of population with tertiary education (log) 171 3.660 0.875 -5.82 -1.29 
Diversity index 171 0.107 0.091 0.001 0.491 
Country tax decentralization 171 12.061 7.499 0.52 26.37 
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Table A2. Pair-wise correlation among the variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Regional authority index (rai) 1 
            Income per capita 0.560 1 
           Bilingual region 0.222 0.187 1 
          Autonomous region 0.205 0.115 0.510 1 
         Capital region -0.047 0.221 -0.033 -0.106 1 
        Population of the region 0.017 0.068 -0.063 -0.195 0.166 1 
       Size of the region -0.159 -0.269 -0.078 -0.076 -0.399 0.431 1 
      EU-15 region 0.520 0.820 0.178 0.185 -0.055 0.020 -0.069 1 
     Contiguity spillover 0.828 0.495 0.091 -0.134 0.008 0.170 -0.061 0.379 1 
    Presence of independent media 0.359 0.462 0.131 0.179 -0.054 -0.045 0.022 0.522 0.295 1 
   Population with tertiary education -0.034 0.064 0.050 0.119 0.112 -0.813 -0.496 -0.021 -0.120 0.090 1 
  Diversity index 0.399 0.583 0.299 0.058 0.269 -0.080 -0.303 0.483 0.301 0.215 0.132 1 
 Country tax decentralization 0.654 0.362 0.074 -0.016 -0.048 -0.022 0.017 0.327 0.630 0.429 0.023 0.298 1 
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Table A3. Pairwise correlation between the qog index and its three pillars 
  Euqogindex Impartialty Corruption Quality 
Euqogindex 1 
   Impartiality 0.65 1 
  Corruption 0.86 0.73 1 
 Quality 0.61 0.44 0.59 1 
 
Table A4. Moran autocorrelation test 
Variables I E(I) sd(I) z p-value 
Euqogindex 0.853 -0.006 0.061 13.986 0.000 
Note: I=Moran Index; E(I)= expected value of Moran's I under the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation 
 
Table A5. Testing for autocorrelation by using variance inflation factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Income per capita 7.35 0.136 
EU-15 region 6.70 0.149 
Contiguity autonomy 5.64 0.177 
Country tax decentralization 2.59 0.386 
Size of the region 2.26 0.442 
Autonomous region 2.11 0.473 
Decentralization (raireg) 2.10 0.476 
Capital region 1.93 0.519 
Presence of independent media 1.90 0.526 
Population of the region 1.89 0.529 
Bilingual region 1.52 0.659 
Diversity index 2.52 0.485 
Share of population with tertiary education 3.52 0.246 
Note: we have reported here only the VIF test after the first estimation as for Table 1 (column 1). The VIF test 
performed for the remaining three models report virtually the same results. 
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Table A6. Dose response function of regional autonomy on the performance of local public services and its three 
pillars for EU 15 regions– impartiality, lack of corruption, and quality of local services. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Index Impartiality Lack of corruption Quality 
Dichotomy decentralization treatment -0.508* 0.0551 -0.388 -0.397** 
 
(0.261) (0.292) (0.291) (0.180) 
     Income per capita 2.163*** 0.924*** 2.107*** 1.863*** 
 
(0.299) (0.322) (0.291) (0.232) 
     Bilingual region 0.344 0.290 0.345 0.232 
 
(0.228) (0.303) (0.220) (0.152) 
     Autonomous region 0.0311 0.142 0.202 0.0145 
 
(0.254) (0.296) (0.240) (0.199) 
     Capital region 0.235 0.059 -0.005 -0.105 
 
(0.281) (0.283) (0.276) (0.178) 
     Population of the region -0.566*** -0.085 -0.388*** -0.303*** 
 
(0.132) (0.104) (0.125) (0.103) 
     Size of the region 0.213*** 0.090 0.121* 0.126*** 
 
(0.0618) (0.0667) (0.0638) (0.0474) 
     Contiguity spillover -0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.011 
 
(0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0141) 
     Presence of independent media -0.127 -0.098 -0.004 0.570*** 
 
(0.0797) (0.0835) (0.0703) (0.0569) 
     Population with tertiary education -0.317** -0.050 -0.298** -0.212* 
 
(0.138) (0.130) (0.142) (0.118) 
     Diversity index -2.198** -0.616 -1.824** -2.146*** 
 
(0.867) (1.187) (0.893) (0.577) 
     Country tax decentralization 0.026** 0.075*** 0.052*** -0.056*** 
 
(0.0110) (0.0142) (0.0118) (0.00935) 
     Polynomial degree 1 (Tw_1) -0.092*** -0.292*** -0.142*** -0.058** 
 
(0.0330) (0.0401) (0.0317) (0.0242) 
Polynomial degree 2 (Tw_2) 0.000997 0.00546*** 0.00227*** 0.000736 
 
(0.000660) (0.000794) (0.000638) (0.000476) 
Polynomial degree 3 (Tw_3) -0.00000240 -0.0000301*** -0.0000116*** -0.00000223 
 
(0.00000380) (0.00000458) (0.00000374) (0.00000276) 
     test_b[Tw_1]=_b[Tw_2]=_b[Tw_3]=0 rejected rejected rejected rejected 
 
Prob > F = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.01 
Observations 126 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.599 0.653 0.644 0.778 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table A7. Dose response function of the self-rule component of regional autonomy on the performance of local 
public services and its three pillars for EU 15 regions– impartiality, lack of corruption, and quality of local services. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Index Impartiality Lack of corruption Quality 
     Dichotomy decentralization treatment -1.103*** 0.205 -0.939*** -0.0674 
 
(0.316) (0.310) (0.311) (0.279) 
     Income per capita 1.477*** 0.652*** 1.231*** 1.300*** 
 
(0.236) (0.241) (0.274) (0.226) 
     Bilingual region 0.184 0.405 0.284 0.221 
 
(0.200) (0.311) (0.219) (0.154) 
     Autonomous region 0.260 0.496* 0.313 0.102 
 
(0.198) (0.265) (0.206) (0.167) 
     Capital region -0.410** -0.144 -0.548** -0.359** 
 
(0.201) (0.262) (0.272) (0.179) 
     Population of the region -0.381*** -0.156 -0.233* -0.189* 
 
(0.126) (0.116) (0.119) (0.112) 
     Size of the region 0.0472 0.0683 0.00276 0.0644 
 
(0.0588) (0.0674) (0.0663) (0.0485) 
     Eu15 0.067 -0.131 -0.171 -0.624** 
 
(0.277) (0.288) (0.337) (0.256) 
     Contiguity spillover 0.034** 0.0404* 0.0237 0.039*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0210) (0.0179) (0.0122) 
     Presence of independent media 0.018 -0.148** 0.167** 0.596*** 
 
(0.0668) (0.0682) (0.0688) (0.0622) 
     Population with tertiary education -0.313** -0.0738 -0.286** -0.155 
 
(0.137) (0.124) (0.139) (0.132) 
     Diversity index -1.197* -0.165 -1.264 -1.979*** 
 
(0.689) (1.033) (0.831) (0.541) 
     Country tax decentralization 0.047*** 0.071*** 0.054*** -0.048*** 
 
(0.0110) (0.0131) (0.0111) (0.00996) 
     Polynomial degree 1 (Tw_1) 0.0342 -0.191** 0.153 -0.148** 
 
(0.0865) (0.0776) (0.0941) (0.0671) 
     Polynomial degree 2 (Tw_2) -0.000820 0.00237 -0.00309* 0.00219* 
 
(0.00164) (0.00147) (0.00176) (0.00128) 
     Polynomial degree 3 (Tw_3) 0.00000358 -0.00000917 0.0000172* -0.0000108 
 
(0.00000913) (0.00000814) (0.00000980) (0.00000720) 
     test _b[Tw_1]=_b[Tw_2]=_b[Tw_3]=0 accepted rejected accepted rejected 
 
Prob > F = 0.533 Prob > F = 0.00 Prob > F = 0.113 Prob > F = 0.00 
Observations 171 171 171 171 
R-squared 0.721 0.659 0.655 0.772 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
